wildebeest (wildebeest) security report
SecureChain Radar AI scanned the verified Wildebeest token source and reviewed GoPlus evidence. No critical issue was found. Material risks are the trenchManager's ability to restrict or freeze transfers and its initial control of the full token supply. Slither was not run.
The contract was AI scanned using the verified source and supplied GoPlus evidence.
Trust score: 72/100. Source verified: Yes. Chain: ethereum. Contract: 0x57737ded3870e43fed7d80d31e0ced3d5fb0cccc.
This report was last modified on 2026-10-07 and contains 2 material findings.
high finding: trenchManager can freeze all token transfers
The privileged trenchManager can call setMode(1), placing the token in MODE_TRANSFER_RESTRICTED. In that mode, _beforeTokenTransfer reverts every transfer, including transfers involving the manager, transfers through decentralized exchanges, and transfersFrom operations. This can completely lock token holders until the manager changes the mode.
Evidence: Token3.sol defines MODE_TRANSFER_RESTRICTED = 1. _beforeTokenTransfer reverts with ERR_TOKEN_TRANSFER_RESTRICTED whenever _mode equals that value. setMode is publicly callable but requires msg.sender == trenchManager, giving that address exclusive control over the mode.
Recommendation: Use a timelocked or multisignature-controlled mode change, emit an event for every mode update, document the allowed lifecycle, and consider permanently disabling the restricted mode after launch. Monitor the current _mode and all setMode transactions.
medium finding: Transfers are centrally controlled until the manager changes the mode
The constructor initializes _mode to MODE_TRANSFER_CONTROLLED. While this mode is active, transfers are permitted only when the sender or recipient is trenchManager. Ordinary holder-to-holder transfers and standard DEX token movements can therefore fail unless the manager is one side of the transfer or changes the mode. This creates a material operational dependency on a privileged address.
Evidence: The constructor sets _mode = MODE_TRANSFER_CONTROLLED. _beforeTokenTransfer requires from == trenchManager || to == trenchManager when _mode equals 2. setMode can change the mode only when called by trenchManager. GoPlus reports the token is trading and not a honeypot, but it does not remove the source-level dependency on this privileged mode state.
Recommendation: Test buy, sell, transfer, and transferFrom paths after every mode change.