Super CZ (SUPERCZ) security report
Radar AI scanned Super CZ's verified BNB Smart Chain ERC-20 source. The contract has no admin, fee, blacklist, pause, proxy, or post-deployment mint logic. One medium-severity risk remains: the constructor assigns the full initial supply to the deployer.
No critical or high-severity exploit was identified in the verified source. The main material risk is that the constructor assigns the complete initial supply to the deployer, creating centralized allocation control at launch. The contract itself provides no vesting, distribution, or administrative controls to mitigate that allocation.
Trust score: 88/100. Source verified: Yes. Chain: bsc. Contract: 0x33e8147a1267b139011e761d3673a904eac8dcf2.
This report was last modified on 2026-10-01 and contains 1 material finding.
medium finding: Entire initial supply is assigned to the deployer
The constructor mints the full configured initial supply directly to msg.sender. This creates a centralized initial allocation and leaves distribution, vesting, or retention decisions outside the token contract.
Evidence: In contracts/BEP20.sol, the constructor executes _mint(msg.sender, initialSupply_). The inherited OpenZeppelin _mint function credits the supplied amount to that address and increases totalSupply. No vesting, timelock, allocation split, or transfer restriction is implemented.
Recommendation: Publish and maintain a verifiable allocation and vesting plan for the deployer-held supply, or use a separate vesting and distribution mechanism if staged release is required. Review deployment and treasury procedures because the token contract cannot enforce those controls.