ROUTARGO (RTR) security report
Radar by SecureChain AI scanned ROUTARGO's verified source on BNB Smart Chain. The token uses standard fixed-supply ERC-20 logic, with one medium-severity allocation concentration risk.
The verified source does not show a honeypot mechanism, transfer tax, blacklist, privileged minting, pause control, or upgrade path. One medium-severity business-logic risk remains: all tokens are initially assigned to the constructor recipient, so that recipient can transfer or sell its allocation without any contract-enforced vesting or distribution controls.
Trust score: 78/100. Source verified: Yes. Chain: bsc. Contract: 0x7aea9ae76c32782b33d4b0f1553860616f8b0b19.
This report was last modified on 2026-10-08 and contains 1 material finding.
medium finding: Entire fixed supply is initially assigned to one recipient
The constructor mints the complete token supply to the address supplied as recipient. There is no vesting, timelock, distribution schedule, or contract-level restriction limiting that recipient's subsequent transfers. This creates a material allocation and control risk, although it is not an unauthorized-transfer exploit because the recipient owns the tokens legitimately.
Evidence: In ROUTARGO's constructor, `_mint(recipient, 4025017584 * 10 ** decimals())` assigns the entire 4,025,017,584-token nominal supply to the single constructor argument. The inherited ERC-20 transfer function then permits that recipient to transfer its balance subject only to normal balance checks.
Recommendation: Document the initial allocation and recipient identity, and consider transparent vesting, timelocks, multisignature custody, or staged distribution if concentration is not intended. Monitor transfers from the initial recipient as an operational control, not as a substitute for on-chain vesting.