OG (OG) security report
Radar AI scanned the verified OG contract on Ethereum. The contract has no minting, owner controls, blacklist, pause, upgradeability, or transfer tax. A medium-severity accounting issue remains: transfers to DEAD increase totalBurned without reducing totalSupply.
No critical or high-severity exploit was identified. The principal issue is a medium-severity burn-accounting inconsistency: tokens sent to DEAD are irreversibly inaccessible, yet totalSupply does not decrease, which can cause integrations or tokenomics calculations to misrepresent effective circulating supply.
Trust score: 92/100. Source verified: Yes. Chain: ethereum. Contract: 0xce7eb1ad9e2e1c784ea05f7ea4a0fe625923d10a.
This report was last modified on 2026-10-08 and contains 1 material finding.
medium finding: Burn transfers do not reduce totalSupply
The contract treats transfers to DEAD as burns by incrementing totalBurned, but totalSupply is a fixed constant and is never reduced. The DEAD balance also remains included in balance accounting. This creates a divergence between the contract's burn counter and its reported total supply.
Evidence: In _transfer(), if to == DEAD, the contract executes totalBurned += amount after increasing balanceOf[to]. totalSupply is declared as the constant 1_000_000_000 ether and has no mutation path. The source comment explicitly states that burning is an ordinary transfer to DEAD, never a supply reduction.
Recommendation: Document this nonstandard burn model prominently and ensure indexers, dashboards, governance systems, and tokenomics calculations use totalBurned and DEAD balances correctly rather than assuming totalSupply decreases after a burn. If supply-reducing burns are intended, implement an explicit supply-decrementing burn design and update the associated accounting invariants.