Field Atlas (ATLAS) security report
Field Atlas was AI scanned using verified source and GoPlus evidence. Radar found no exposed minting, blacklist, transfer tax, or proxy signal. The main concerns are centralized owner-controlled pool locking and an initialization-controlled anti-whale balance cap that can reject transfers.
Field Atlas was AI scanned from verified source and GoPlus evidence. The main risk is centralized owner control over pool locking, which can cause transfers to a designated pool or routing address to revert and halt trading. A temporary anti-whale balance limit can also reject transfers above the configured cap. No minting, blacklist, tax, or proxy behavior was identified from the supplied evidence.
Trust score: 62/100. Source verified: Yes. Chain: base. Contract: 0xb462a5039a540883508ee37b5cf3999647557ba3.
This report was last modified on 2026-11-02 and contains 2 material findings.
high finding: Owner can block transfers to a designated pool or routing address
The owner can call lockPool(address), set the global pool address, and activate a transfer restriction. While locked, every transfer or transferFrom whose recipient equals pool reverts with PoolLocked. This can prevent sells or other pool interactions if the owner designates the relevant liquidity or routing recipient. The owner can later unlock the pool, but there is no timelock or governance delay.
Evidence: Verified source: lockPool(address pool_) is external onlyOwner, assigns pool = pool_, sets isPoolLocked = true, and _beforeTokenTransfer reverts when to == pool && isPoolLocked. GoPlus reports UniswapV4 pools using PoolManager 0x498581ff718922c3f8e6a244956af099b2652b2b.
Recommendation: Use an immutable or permanently validated pool address, restrict pool changes to a timelocked governance process, emit explicit configuration events, and consider removing the owner-controlled lock after launch.
medium finding: Initialization-controlled balance cap can reject ordinary transfers
When configured during initialization, the contract enforces maxBalanceLimit for recipients that are not excluded. Transfers to a non-excluded address revert if its resulting balance exceeds the cap until balanceLimitEnd. The initializer also controls the excluded-address list, and the controller can disable the limit early. This creates a meaningful transfer restriction and operational dependency on configuration and controller behavior.
Evidence: Verified source: initialize sets maxBalanceLimit, balanceLimitEnd, isBalanceLimitActive, and isExcludedFromBalanceLimit. _beforeTokenTransfer calculates balanceOf(to) + value and reverts with BalanceLimitExceeded when the recipient is not excluded and the limit is active. GoPlus reports is_anti_whale=1 and anti_whale_modifiable=1. The supplied snapshot does not include the configured cap or expiration values.
Recommendation: Publish and validate the configured cap, expiration, controller, and exclusions; avoid excluding privileged recipients without disclosure; and use a transparent governance or timelock process for disabling the restriction.