EtherDog (ETHERDOG) security report
EtherDog was AI-scanned from verified source and GoPlus evidence. No conventional mint, tax, blacklist, pause, or upgrade controls were found. Slither was not run.
The source does not show a conventional mint, fee, blacklist, honeypot, or upgrade backdoor. However, every non-mint transfer depends on an external immutable distributor callback, creating a transfer-lock risk. GoPlus reports that approximately 100% of supply is held by one contract address, which is a material concentration and distribution risk. Slither was not run.
Trust score: 72/100. Source verified: Yes. Chain: ethereum. Contract: 0xf79a5d3c2f302bc794ec3cd26bc36792e4f50dd0.
This report was last modified on 2026-09-29 and contains 1 material finding.
medium finding: Immutable external distributor can block all token transfers
Every transfer after minting performs an external call to the immutable distributor address. If that address is a contract that reverts, runs out of required dependencies, or intentionally rejects callbacks, token transfers and transferFrom operations will revert. The token has no administrative method to replace or disable the distributor after deployment.
Evidence: In LaunchToken._update, after super._update(from, to, value), the condition `if (from != address(0) && distributor != address(0))` calls `IHolderDistributor(distributor).onTransfer(from, to, value, balanceOf(from), balanceOf(to))`. The distributor is assigned once in the constructor as an immutable address. The supplied ABI exposes no setter or bypass function. GoPlus reports `external_call: 0`, but the verified source explicitly contains this external call.
Recommendation: Verify the deployed distributor implementation, its initialization state, and whether onTransfer can revert under normal transfers. Prefer a fail-open, non-blocking accounting design or a distributor with an auditable emergency-disable mechanism before relying on the token for trading.