Bunker Mode (BUNKER) security report
Radar AI scanned Bunker Mode on Ethereum. The verified source shows a fixed-supply ERC-20 without visible mint, tax, blacklist, pause, or upgrade controls, but every non-mint transfer calls an immutable external distributor that could block transfers if it reverts.
The verified token source does not show minting after deployment, transfer taxes, blacklist controls, pausing, proxy upgradeability, or owner withdrawal functions. One medium-severity transfer-availability risk exists because every non-mint transfer depends on an external distributor callback.
Trust score: 76/100. Source verified: Yes. Chain: ethereum. Contract: 0x735c974d5ac7babc85d6038bc0412c5c062a2b3e.
This report was last modified on 2026-10-08 and contains 1 material finding.
medium finding: Immutable external distributor can block token transfers
Every non-mint transfer performs an external call to the immutable distributor address after the ERC-20 balance update. If that distributor reverts, runs out of gas, or is otherwise incompatible, the entire token transfer transaction reverts and transfers can become unavailable. The distributor address cannot be changed after deployment.
Evidence: In LaunchToken._update, after super._update(from, to, value), the contract executes IHolderDistributor(distributor).onTransfer(from, to, value, balanceOf(from), balanceOf(to)) whenever from is not address(0) and distributor is not address(0). The distributor is assigned in the constructor and declared immutable. Slither was not run; the behavior is confirmed by independent source review.
Recommendation: Verify the deployed distributor bytecode and behavior, including its transfer callback failure modes and gas requirements. Consider removing the mandatory callback, using a non-blocking design, or adding a controlled migration path if the architecture permits. Test transfers against the exact deployed distributor implementation.