Boar (Boar) security report
Radar AI scanned Boar's verified Ethereum contract and reviewed GoPlus evidence. No mint, tax, blacklist, or proxy issue was identified, but the token starts in transfer-controlled mode and an immutable trenchManager can restrict transfers. Slither was not run.
The main risk is transfer control: the contract starts in MODE_TRANSFER_CONTROLLED, where transfers are permitted only when the sender or recipient is the immutable trenchManager. A normal holder-to-holder transfer, and potentially a standard Uniswap sell, can revert unless the mode has been changed or the manager is directly involved. The manager can also set MODE_TRANSFER_RESTRICTED, which blocks all token transfers while that mode remains active. GoPlus reports no honeypot, taxes, mintability, blacklist, or proxy, but the source-level authority remains material.
Trust score: 58/100. Source verified: Yes. Chain: ethereum. Contract: 0xbb82cb78600774765f3f4f72faadb979fdc0cccc.
This report was last modified on 2026-09-29 and contains 3 material findings.
high finding: Default transfer-controlled mode can block ordinary transfers and standard DEX sells
The constructor sets _mode to MODE_TRANSFER_CONTROLLED. In that mode, every transfer requires either from == trenchManager or to == trenchManager. A regular holder-to-holder transfer fails, and a conventional Uniswap V2 sell from a holder to the pair can also fail when neither address is trenchManager. This is a honeypot-like restriction if the token remains in this mode and the manager is not integrated into the transfer path.
Evidence: Token constructor: `_mode = MODE_TRANSFER_CONTROLLED`. `_beforeTokenTransfer` requires `from == trenchManager || to == trenchManager` whenever `_mode == MODE_TRANSFER_CONTROLLED`. GoPlus reports a UniswapV2 pair and `is_honeypot: 0`, but no supplied evidence establishes that the current on-chain mode is MODE_NORMAL or that the pair equals trenchManager.
Recommendation: Verify the current on-chain value of _mode and the trenchManager address before trading. If unrestricted transfers are intended, use MODE_NORMAL and document the transition. Test buys, sells, router transferFrom calls, and holder-to-holder transfers against the deployed addresses.
medium finding: Immutable trenchManager has unilateral transfer-policy control
The immutable trenchManager is the sole account authorized to call setMode. It can switch the token into MODE_TRANSFER_RESTRICTED, causing every subsequent transfer to revert, or keep the token in controlled mode where ordinary transfers remain unavailable. The manager can later change a non-normal mode, so the restriction is not cryptographically irreversible, but users depend on that privileged address and its key availability.
Evidence: `setMode(uint256 v)` requires `msg.sender == trenchManager` and writes `_mode = v` whenever the current mode is not MODE_NORMAL. In restricted mode, `_beforeTokenTransfer` unconditionally reverts with ERR_TOKEN_TRANSFER_RESTRICTED. The constructor assigns the entire TOTAL_SUPPLY to trenchManager and makes trenchManager immutable. GoPlus reports `transfer_pausable: 0`, but that signal does not remove the source-level mode authority.
Recommendation: Disclose the trenchManager address and governance model, monitor all setMode calls, and protect the manager with appropriate multisignature or timelock controls. Add an operational runbook and emergency verification that transfers remain functional after any mode change.
medium finding: Token distribution and launch behavior depend on a privileged manager contract
The full fixed supply is minted to trenchManager at deployment, while the initial controlled transfer mode permits movement only to or from that address. This makes the manager a required intermediary for initial distribution and potentially for trading. Failure, compromise, or unexpected behavior of that immutable address can materially impair distribution or user exits even though the token itself has no public mint function.
Evidence: Constructor calls `_mint(trenchManager, TOTAL_SUPPLY)` and then sets controlled mode. The supplied source contains no public or external mint function. GoPlus reports `is_mintable: 0`, owner balance of zero, and no proxy, but those signals do not eliminate dependence on trenchManager for launch transfers.
Recommendation: Verify the deployed trenchManager implementation and its authorization boundaries separately. Confirm that it cannot arbitrarily seize user balances, and test the complete distribution, approval, router sell, and recovery flows before relying on the token.